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Abstract—Regulatory compliance is of major concern to med-
ical software companies that are involved in developing safety-
critical software whose failure could result in loss of life,
significant property damage or damage to the environment.
A common approach to demonstrate compliance with safety
requirements is through assurance cases, which are structured
arguments, supported by evidence, intended to justify that a
system is acceptably assured. The usage of assurance cases
to prove compliance for other properties other than safety
like cybersecurity has been increasing. However there are no
formal guidelines to follow when creating security assurance
cases as there is for safety assurance cases. The purpose of our
research is to simplify the process of creating security assurance
cases for their products by creating a set of guidelines. By
conducting a design science study at a Swedish cloud-based
medical software company, we analyzed external needs regarding
the best practices in cybersecurity, regulations and standards
in the medical domain. Contrasting these with the company’s
internal needs, we constructed a security assurance case for a
part of their system based on the external and internal needs of
the company. The guidelines were the outcome that emerged out
of the case we created for the company.
Index Terms—SAC, ISO 27002, ISO 27018, HIPAA, artefact
I. INTRODUCTION
In today’s world almost every industry has been disrupted
by software. As the world rapidly becomes more technology
dependent it also leads to security vulnerabilities emerging
[1]. There is a risk that a software’s security vulnerabilities
are exposed which can do severe damage to an organization’s
reputation, economy and in critical cases lead to loss of life [2].
The consequence of an increased amount of security breaches
in technological systems is that governments increase legisla-
tion and regulations for security [3]. Especially in the medical
domain, up until recent years manufacturers of medical devices
were only required to prove that their device was safe and
effective before putting it on the market [4]. But as medical
technology is becoming more complex due to the increasing
percentage of medical device functionality, tougher measures
are required to ensure the security of patient data and safety.
Organizations must demonstrate that their medical devices are
secure by creating and implementing a security plan and finally
by providing evidence that shows that their medical devices
are free of vulnerability. This is known as creating a security
assurance case (SAC) [5].
Assurance cases are structured arguments supported by
evidence that are used to demonstrate confidence that a system
meets certain requirements. They are similar to a legal case
where claims made are supported by objective evidence for
validity. A simple example of an assurance case is shown
in Figure 1 to give readers an understanding of the structure
of assurance cases. In the past assurance cases were mostly
used in domains such as medical, aviation and automotive to
address safety concerns for systems. However, today assurance
cases are used in many industries to argue for properties such
as security, safety, maintainability and reliability. A security
assurance case argues the security of a system and takes
people, processes and technology into consideration [7] [8].
Since security was not a major concern up until recent years,
there are no formal guidelines to follow when implementing
a security assurance case. However, security assurance cases
need to be developed further and should be considered as
highly important in the medical domain.
The objective of our study is to extract guidelines that can
be used to construct security assurance cases, based on a case
we create in the cloud-based medical software domain.
A set of guidelines will save companies time, reduce the
complexity and simplify the process of creating security as-
surance cases for their products. It will be serving as a reusable
artefact for cloud-based medical software organizations. The
guidelines can be considered as a framework that includes
external requirements such as standards, regulations, and best
practices of cybersecurity both in general, and specifically in
the medical domain. Examples of the general ones are the ISO
27000 series of standards in information security management
systems [9] and General Data Protection Regulation GDPR
[10]; domain-specific resources include, e.g., the Framework
for Responsible Sharing of Genomic and Health-Related Data
[11]. Companies can then build on top of this framework to
fit their internal processes in order to create a security assur-
ance case that can be integrated into their risk management
procedures.
To create the guidelines we will study the external and in-
ternal needs of 1928 Diagnostics, a Swedish medical company
that develops software to analyze the DNA of pathogens for
antibiotic resistance. The guidelines will be derived from a
security assurance case we create for the company. The com-
pany puts high value on ensuring the integrity and availability
of confidential data they receive from customers. Therefore
we will create a security assurance case covering data transfer
between clients and 1928 Diagnostics cloud service.
Deriving the guidelines from a real life case done at
1928 Diagnostics, will justify the value of the guidelines,
which aims to facilitate the process of constructing SAC
for cloud-based medical software organizations. Besides from
the guidelines, our study can be used as a starting point
for cloud-based medical software organizations that wants
to introduce the usage of security assurance cases in their
company’s development process. By using our results (the
created artefacts) and learning from our mistakes they can both
save time and avoid potential pitfalls.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents more background on assurance cases and an overview
of relevant research. Section III presents our research questions
and describes the research methodology, our data collection
and data analysis strategies. Section IV presents the results of
our research. Section V discusses the findings of our study
and limitations to our research. Lastly, section VI concludes
the paper with the key points of our research.
Fig. 1. Example structure of a simple assurance case [28]
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Security is a key factor when developing software, espe-
cially today as medical devices become more digitized and are
constantly evolving with everything from wearable trackers to
implantable sensors. The challenge for organizations is how
to mitigate the security risks for their medical products. Many
institutes such as The National Defense Industrial Association
(NDIA) and National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) suggest the use of assurance cases in their documents
for providing justification to stakeholders that critical proper-
ties of systems uphold certain requirements [30].
Security assurance cases consist of a structured arguments
part where claims about a system’s security are made and an
evidence part that is used to justify the claims made on the
argumentation part by providing evidence such as results of
tests, simulations, analysis, etc. SAC can either be presented
textually or graphically, but a graphical representation is more
common and also more understandable [7].
Since security was not a major concern in the medical
domain up until recent years, there has not been as much usage
of SAC in literature as there is for safety assurance cases.
One of the related studies we found is the work by Finnegan
et al. [12]. The research presents a security case framework
which is currently under development. The purpose of the
framework is to provide healthcare organizations and medical
device manufacturers a solution to ensure the security of
medical devices. The researchers present a number of existing
international standards, guidance documents and processes
which aim to guide the development of the security argument
pattern. Since there is no standardised way to address security
requirements in the medical devices domain, the researchers
aim to investigate the gaps that exist when medical devices
organizations want to fulfill new security requirements. Part
of their study is to validate the security case framework in
industry both with medical device manufacturers and health-
care delivery organisations. Similar to our study, the goal of
their research is to simplify the process of creating SAC in the
medical domain, however the difference is that we are creating
guidelines while they are creating a pattern. A distinction can
be made between patterns and guidelines, guidelines are a set
of recommendations that can be followed to solve a problem,
whereas a pattern suggests a specific solution to a problem
[31]. Their work provides guidance documents and processes
which can be useful for our study to address the security
requirements and identify problems when covering security
cases in a medical software organization.
In one study by Weinstock et al. [7]. The authors simplify
the process of constructing security assurance cases, by pre-
senting an explicit example on how to create a pattern from
a security case and generalize it. This pattern can then be
used as a template to construct other security assurance cases.
For example, they address security vulnerabilities that appear
during different stages of the software development life cycle
(requirements, design, implementation). The researchers also
discuss the benefits of creating security case patterns and
how the patterns provide usability by outlining the security
claims. The approach and the techniques used in their study
for creating and generalizing security cases, will be used in
our research to construct a SAC for 1928 Diagnostics.
Another paper we reviewed is about safety assurance cases
by Smith et al. [6]. Despite the difference between security
and safety we can use this paper for inspiration when creating
SAC. In software, a safe system is one that does not acci-
dentally harm people, property, environment or itself. While
security is about ensuring that a system works correctly even
under attack, by applying security techniques and practices
[21].
In their study Smith et al. gives an overview about assurance
cases and the development of an assurance case for 3dfim+,
an existing Medical Imaging Application (MIA) for analyzing
activity in the brain. The researchers present this example to
explain the value of applying assurance cases for Scientific
Computing Software (SCS) [6].
In our study we will also use assurance cases in the medical
field, but we will focus on creating security assurance cases.
However, since the guidelines for creating security assurance
cases is not established as it is for safety assurance cases, we
can gain knowledge on how to create SAC through studying
safety assurance cases.
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
To conduct our research we used the design science research
(DSR) method at 1928 Diagnostics company by following
the information systems design research framework as per
Hevner [13]. Being in the business environment helped us to
understand the requirements and constraints of the problems
while creating artefacts that fulfill the company’s business
needs. We chose design science methodology because the
objective of our study was not to create useful artefacts that
were limited to the company we studied, but rather by all
companies in the same domain. To create guidelines which
can be used by cloud-based medical software organizations
to construct their security assurance cases, we formulated the
following research questions:
A. Research Questions
• RQ1: What are the needs and the requirements for
creating SAC in a cloud-based medical software service
organization?
• RQ2: What does a prototypical SAC in a cloud-based
medical software service organization look like?
• RQ3: Which guidelines for creating security assurance
cases should cloud-based medical software service orga-
nizations follow?
RQ1: The purpose of this question is to identify the external
requirements and the best practices presented in the literature
and documents such as standards and regulation for creating
SAC.
RQ2: aims to identify a cloud-based medical software ser-
vice company’s internal processes and practices when creating
security assurance cases. Additionally, the question aims to
demonstrate evidence that justifies the claims when covering
a security case in a cloud-based medical software service
organization.
RQ3: Our goal is to identify and specify guidelines that
can be used to create SAC for cloud-based medical software
service organizations. The guidelines will be based on the steps
we take to create SAC for one of 1928 Diagnostic’s products.
B. Research Strategy
To find the answers for the research questions we decided
to take an iterative approach which consisted of two iterations.
The aim of each iteration was to answer one or more parts of
our research questions defined in this study and as a result
produce an artefact.
Figure 2 shows the steps taken in each iteration during
the research. Each iteration was based on following the five
general steps of DSR by Vaishnavi Kuechler [17] as seen in
Figure 3.
1) Problem Awareness: The first step was to identify and
understand the problem by studying the current state of
SACs in the cloud-based medical software service domain,
through reading standards, regulations, and best practices of
cybersecurity in the domain as well as gathering information
from individuals in the company.
2) Suggestion: Once we got acquainted with the problem,
we studied and gathered relevant data to propose a solution. In
the first iteration this was done through literature review while
in the next iteration the solution was based on data gathered
from interviews.
3) Development: In this step we create an artefact based
on the suggestion from the previous step. The artefact of the
first iteration was a document consisting of the company’s
needs and requirements for creating SAC. The second artefact
which will be created in iteration two is a security assurance
case. The guidelines which can be used to construct security
assurance cases, will be extracted from the SAC artefact from
the second iteration.
4) Evaluation: This step is similar in both iterations, we
evaluate the usefulness and understandability of the arte-
fact that was developed in the previous step through semi-
structured interviews with company representatives.
5) Conclusion: We update and improve the artefact based
on the feedback we get during evaluation. The iteration reaches
its end and the result is a validated artefact.
C. First Iteration
The first iteration provided us with an answer to RQ1.
1) Eliciting external requirements and identifying existing
guidelines in literature (Artefact Development): The first step
for us was to identify the current best practices and approaches
reported in the literature for creating SAC in the medical
domain. We did this by studying the papers mentioned in
the related work section. We also reviewed the standards and
regulations that medical software service organizations must
comply with, which mainly were ISO 27002 [18] and ISO
27018 [19]. Our goal was to create a document consisting of
the external requirements a medical device company needs to
fulfill to put their products on the market based on the literature
and the mentioned standards. However, after our first meeting
with the QA/RA manager of 1928 Diagnostics we decided
that our artefact would end up as a document covering both
external and parts of the internal needs of the company. The
reason for that is we received a draft of the company’s white
paper which contained the security practices the company had
in place to be compliant with regulations. He also suggested
that we take a look into HIPAA security rule and privacy
rule papers [20]. We analyzed the white paper and suggested
documents and then picked out the best security practices and
requirements to create our first artefact.
The initial artefact was a table showing the best practices
and the techniques to ensure and mitigate security risks based
on the company white paper. We then described each practice
as it was referred to the in standards (ISO 27002 [18], ISO
27018 [19]). Finally we described how each listed practice was
Fig. 2. Our research process
Fig. 3. Design Science Research general steps
related to SAC whether using SAC to show usage of a practice
was beneficial or mentioned implicitly in the standards.
2) Evaluating the created artefact with the company (Data
Collection): To evaluate the artefact we developed, we con-
ducted interviews with two practitioners from 1928 Diagnos-
tics. One with the CTO of the company to gain a broader
understanding of their system and security and another with a
developer to learn about the technical details such as functions
and components. The interviews were semi-structured to allow
the interviewee to explain their thoughts and highlight the
most important insights in the area, as well as to enable deep
answers about certain questions to gather qualitative data [16].
Appendix A contains the defined questions aimed to evaluate
the first artefact.
The interviews were hosted through a web chat application
and recorded with consent of the interviewees. The interviews
lasted about 30 minutes each and started with an introduction
about our study. During the interview we presented the prac-
titioners with a simple example of SAC as seen in Appendix
B and the created document.
3) Analyzing the collected data from the company to im-
prove the artefact (Data Analysis): We followed the thematic
analysis method and divided data into themes and categories
[14]. The interview questions we came up with were divided
into different themes before we began with the interviews. The
questions were divided into the following four themes:
• Demographic: Participants’ backgrounds and knowledge
regarding SAC.
• Values: Understanding what the participant regards as
valuable when it comes to security.
• Structure: In what way and how the company is taking
measurements to assure security and comply with prac-
tices before creation of SAC.
• Usefulness: In what way will SAC be useful to the
company, who will benefit from it and how can it be
used.
After the interviews we transcribed the gathered data from
the interviews with Temi, an online transcription tool. Once
all the raw data was transcribed, we followed the thematic
analysis method and read through the transcribed data and
systematically code the data we had by categorizing parts of
information under the identified themes as seen in Appendix
C.
D. Second Iteration
The second iteration provided us with an answer to RQ2
and RQ3.
1) Eliciting internal requirements and creating a security
assurance case (Artefact Development): Our first goal in
this iteration was to understand the internal needs of the
company to allow us to create SAC. We started the second
iteration by conducting two more interviews with the same
people we interviewed at the end of the first iteration (CTO
and a developer) from the organization. We made sure to
understand possible usages of SAC for the company. We also
asked questions to get an overview of the company’s current
structure and how they assure that their products are secure.
The main goal of the interviews was for the researchers and
interviewees to get a shared understanding of how SAC should
be constructed and later used.
The next step after we understood the internal and ex-
ternal needs of the company, was to get in touch with the
QA/RA manager of 1928 Diagnostics in order to receive
company’s risk analysis, software architecture, and software
design specification documents. These documents helped us
get an overview of their system. We later extracted the security
related parts of the system to a new document and used it to
create a SAC for a part of their system.
Once we had the document with the security relevant
features, we used that together with the data we gathered at
the start of iteration two and from the first iteration to create a
security assurance case covering the transfer of bacterial DNA
samples from the users to the cloud service.
We presentented the proposed security assurance case
through interviews where the goal was to evaluate the final
artefact and make sure the organization representatives had
the correct understanding of the artefact. Feedback from the
interviews in the end of this iteration helped us to update and
finalize the SAC. Additionally it helped us to construct the
guidelines.
At the end of the iteration after the SAC had been evaluated,
we created guidelines that can be used as a starting point for
cloud-based medical software service organizations when con-
structing security assurance cases. The guidelines are derived
from the SAC we created for 1928 Diagnostics and based on
our learning experience during our study.
2) Conducting interviews to collect data for creation and
evaluation of the SAC (Data Collection): At the start of the
second iteration we conducted two interviews with the prac-
titioners from the previous iteration to collect data regarding
internal needs in order to create SAC. Appendix D contains
the defined questions.
The interviews were semi-structured similar to the iteration
and were also hosted online through Zoom and recorded with
consent of the interviewees. The interviews lasted about 30
minutes and we started with presenting the practitioners with
a more detailed example of SAC as seen in Appendix E.
After creating the SAC we conducted two more interviews
with three people to evaluate the artefact. One interview was
with the QA/RA manager of 1928 Diagnostics and another one
was an interview with two developers at the same time. Similar
to the interviews at the start of the iteration, they were semi-
structured, hosted and recorded through Zoom. The developers
we interviewed were knowledgeable with the technical aspect
of the company. The evaluation questions that are listed in
Appendix H, were asked to understand the usefulness of the
SAC and to make sure it was in alignment with the company’s
system.
3) Analyzing the collected data from the company to create
and then improve the SAC (Data Analysis): For analyzing the
data from the first interviews in this iteration we used the same
data analysis method and defined themes from the previous
iteration. Before conducting the interviews we divided the
questions we came up with into the four themes identified
previously. Once the interviews were conducted, the data was
transcribed and divided into the themes as seen in Appendix
F.
To analyze the evaluation data we collected at the end, we
used the same method but defined new themes before the
interviews. The evaluation questions were divided into the
following five themes:
• Correctness: How much the SAC actually reflects the
architecture and the applied security mechanisms in the
company.
• Quality: Making sure the case is understood by the
company and useful for them.
• Value: Whether the case (and similar ones) would be
valuable to show a certain level of security in the product,
and in this case, who would be interested and why.
• Generalization: If the case can be used to derive guide-
lines for creating SAC for other products within the
company but also in the domain.
• Challenges: How the cases will be maintained and who
will take responsibility to create and update cases. Inte-
grating these steps, in the current company process.
For the final interviews of the iteration we followed the same
procedures as done for the previous interviews, we transcribed
the gathered data with the same transcription tool. Once all the
raw data was transcribed, we read through the transcribed data
and systematically code the data under the identified themes
as seen in Appendix I.
IV. RESULTS
A. First iteration - identification of external needs
To answer our RQ1, our final artefact from iteration one is
presented in Table I. We present the best practices found in
the standards and the company’s white paper. Each practice
refers to which standards they belong to.
The relation between the practices and SAC was not ex-
plicitly mentioned in the analyzed documents, therefore, we
identified the relation between the SAC and the presented
security requirements. We indicated whether using SAC to
present compliance with the practices were beneficial or
implicitly mentioned in the standards. The presented security
requirements in Table I are specific to cloud-based software
service providers.
The standards implicitly state that operating procedures
should be documented and available to all stakeholders [18].
Using SAC it is possible to show the argumentation and
evidence on how logging and monitoring has been applied
by the company [18] [19]. Having a SAC available is also
useful as a document to the company’s stakeholders.
SAC will be beneficial to show that a medical software
TABLE I
ARTEFACT 1 NEEDS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR CREATING SAC IN A MEDICAL SOFTWARE SERVICE ORGANIZATION
Needs Description SAC Reference
Logging
System user and administrator/operator activities, exceptions,
faults and information security events should be logged
and protected. Clocks should be synchronized.
Implicit ISO 27002 [18] & 27018 [19]
Monitoring
Security features are monitored automatically and through
planned internal audits to detect and mitigate actual or track
potential vulnerabilities and both actual and potential intrusions.
Implicit ISO 27002 [18] & 27018 [19]
Backup Appropriate backups should be taken and retainedin accordance with a backup policy. Beneficial ISO 27002 [18], 27018 [19] & HIPAA [20]
Training
Programmers should be training regularly in best
coding practices that help to ensure security. e.g,
define security requirements, Heed compiler warnings.
Beneficial ISO 27002 [18] & 27018 [19]
Redundancies IT facilities should have sufficient redundancyto satisfy availability requirements. Beneficial ISO 27002 [18] & 27018 [19]
Encryption
All connections between users and web servers need
to be encrypted using HTTPS/TLS, which means that
no other person or entity can read or change the information
exchanged. All stored user data, including sample files and
database should be encrypted.
Implicit ISO 27002 [18] & 27018 [19]
Accessibility control
All the servers are Protected by stateful packet inspection
firewalls, with only necessary services allowed. Offer tight
control sharing, only specific users can access data.
Changes in user permissions that are initiated automatically by
the information system and those initiated by an administrator.
Beneficial ISO 27002 [18] & 27018 [19]
Firewalls Uses strict stateful network firewalls to protect all servers,including those processing confidential user data. Implicit ISO 27002 [18] & HIPAA [20]
HIPAA compliance
Follow the rules established by HIPAA for the implementation
of IT and software security controls. These requirements are
important in order to protect personal health information.
Beneficial HIPAA [20]
Records retention
Customers should have the ability to delete data and reports
when no longer needed or when patient or donor consent is revoked.
Customer data are stored until deleted by the customer,
providing complete control over record retention and destruction.
Project Administrators can lock projects to prevent accidental deletion
of any files by anyone other than the project Administrators.
Beneficial ISO 27002 [18] & 27018 [19]
TABLE II





P2 - “I don’t think having
encryption and
Cryptographic controls
as separate makes sense.”
The relationship between







service organization that operates on the cloud is in compli-
ance with the minimum HIPAA requirements such as having
firewalls and backup. The ISO 27002 [18] standard and HIPAA
[20] that contain the backup requirements state to ensure
that all information and software can be recovered. Using a
structured argument-evidence body as SAC can be beneficial
to show that the backup requirement has been met.
For a company to be compliant with the ISO 27002 [18] as
well as HIPAA [20], the organization should ensure that the
network provider manages security networks by using fire-
walls. SAC can be used to provide justification to regulatory
agencies that these solutions are implemented in a system.
SAC will contain evidence and argumentation to indicate that
the organization has fulfilled the security networks require-
ments.
The first version of the document was used as a starting
point for the final artefact. We evaluated it by interviewing
the company to make sure the proposed practices cover the
external requirements that the company needs to fulfill. We
analyzed the data from the interviews by following thematic
analysis method which helped us to update and improve the
artefact. The result of the complete analysis is in Appendix C.
The changes to the original draft of the artefact can be seen in
Table II while the first version of it can be seen in Appendix
G.
Fig. 4. Created SAC in iteration 2 covering transfer of sample data to the cloud service
TABLE III
THE CLOUD SERVICE SYSTEM’S SECURITY FEATURES MAPPED TO ARTEFACT 1 AND CIA




- Users need to be signed in to
upload/download data
- Authorization provided by the web application
framework
- Set user permission depending on work role needs
- Disallow editing of results (every export is write
protected)
- Limit write access to data stored on cloud providers
- Limit access to production instance hosting database and code
Confidentiality, Integrity
Encryption
- Usage of https certificates
- To provide secure connections from the web client
to the server, HTTP over TLS is used, commonly
abbreviated HTTPS. (Files containing data are sent over HTTPs)
- Access to production databases is handled through ssh-keys or equivalent.
Confidentiality, Integrity
Backup
- Implement procedure for backing up databases at
regular intervals.




- Every time we show a result or generate an export




- Use a service provider with high availability to store
sample sequences and that automatically notifies
its administrators when the service is down
- Samples are not stored on the web servers at any
point, but instead the storage API is utilized directly
- Implement protection against ddos attacks
- The REST API is used to directly upload samples
from the client’s computer.
Availability
Training
- Enforce usage of password managers and have
trained personal secure key management.
- Each staff member shall have an individual account
to limit the impact of lost credentials.
Confidentiality, Integrity
B. Second Iteration - creation of the security assurance case
Our second iteration aimed to answer our RQ2 and RQ3.
We created a security assurance case which covers the transfer
of samples to the cloud service. Our artefact is presented
in Figure 4. The security assurance case was constructed
by following the graphical notation called Goal Structuring
Notation (GSN) [7].
The SAC consists of claims made about the system in a
given context, followed by arguments supporting the top-level
claim. Claims are broken down into sub-claims which are
associated with evidence that is used to justify the claims.
The different notations/shapes can be seen in the legend of
Figure 4.
The SAC starts with the top claim C1 (transfer of sample
data to the cloud service is acceptably secure), the claim is
associated with a context. The aim of the context is to define
the scope, where the claim has to uphold. In this case, what
acceptably secure means is defined in the company’s policy
documents.
The selection of the top-claim was based on the company’s
internal needs that we identified in the interviews at the
beginning of the iteration. The remainder of claims, arguments
and evidence that are presented in the SAC was based on the
company’s risk analysis, software architecture, and software
design specification documents we received from the QA/RA
manager of the company.
We analyzed the documents we received and extracted the
security related parts of the system into a new document
called system analysis. The reasoning behind creating a new
document was the size of the system, it would take more time
than available for the thesis to create security assurance cases
covering the whole system. Having a system overview, assets
that are threat targets and dataflow of the system in the system
analysis document simplified the process of creating SAC for
us, instead of having to go through multiple large documents
to find information, we had one with all the security relevant
information about the system in one place. The system analysis
document was used to map the identified security features of
their system to the best security practices described in artefact
1. To evaluate the value of each security feature we related
each feature to one/or more of the three concepts of the CIA
triad model [22], this can be seen in Table III. The three
concepts confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the CIA
triad are considered to be the most crucial components of
information security [22].
For the first argument A1 in Figure 4, we defined our
strategy by looking at the different system views and security
mechanisms that were specified in the software architecture
document, we found the different stages for uploading samples
to the cloud service. In order to justify the top-claim that
TABLE IV
ARTEFACT 2 CHANGES AFTER EVALUATION IN THE SECOND ITERATION
Item Description Change Reason
Claim C1 -
Transfer of the patient’s
data to the cloud service
is acceptably secure
Changed to “Transfer of sample data to
the cloud service is acceptably secure.” Modified
Based on feedback
P1 - “ Yes, it doesn’t have to necessarily be called the patient’s
data because what we’re running analysis on is bacteria. So in the
perfect case, it’s not patient data. actually bacteria data. I’m thinking
just data or sample data.”
Diamond notation
Added a diamond beneath claims that
were missing evidence to indicate
that this needs further development.
Added
Based on feedback
P1 - “One idea can be that you can have a dashed circle under or
something that indicates that, here’s something missing. So then this
could be also used as kind of a gap analysis to identify weaknesses.
And gaps in the argumentation, so a dash line indicating that we
need more claims here. This is just an example.”
Evidence E1.4.1.3-1 -
Connection to database
is made through ssh-keys
Changed to “Database is only
accessible from the cloud service
through a secure encrypted tunnel.”
Modified
Based on feedback
P2 - “I mean yes we use a secure connection, but it’s a database
that is not accessible, none of the ports are open actually. So what
we use is a tunnel, it’s a cloud service provider tool that helps us to
tunnel through the server without opening any open ports, which
means literally nobody can ssh into it. I guess you could say




Changed to “Load balancing handled
by cloud service provider” Modified
Based on feedback
P2- “So I also realized, the protection against DDOS, we had
this implemented in the past but the product we were using we
couldn’t keep using. Right now we have it in the load balancer in
the cloud service provider itself, but we were using a DDOS service
provider in the past but we don’t use it anymore because of HIPAA
compliances. It’s not that it’s not implemented, we can use it when
needed but now we don’t have this like this DDOS service provider





Changed to “Usage of password
managers is recommended” Modified
Based on feedback
P3 - “For example password manager is not enforced, we have
told people this is a good thing to use. But we don’t check if people
actually use it. It’s recommended.”
Claim C1.2.2 -
Users are authorized
(User needs to be
signed in to upload
/download data)
Changed to “Users are
authorized (User needs to be signed
in to upload sample data)”
Modified
Based on feedback
P3 - “Small detail in C1.2.2, you mention download data. The user is
actually not able to download samples, they are able to download




is stored is secure
Added a new claim, which is a stage
that was missing. Added between C1.3
and C1.4, the previous C1.4 is
now C1.5 and all associated boxes
have been updated accordingly.
Added
Based on feedback
P2 - “I would say, yes. I agree that those four things are consistent.
I guess in between C1.3-C.1-4, is probably the point P3 mentioned
that uploading samples to the website is secure, but we also wanna
say the storage after uploading the samples are encrypted or secure.
Right, because that is a different step from the database, consider it
like a file server because we have huge files. If you wanna add it,
it’s stored in a cloud server, because I think it’s fairly
separated from the database and the web server. ”
the transfer of sample data to the cloud service is acceptably
secure, we argued over the security measurement in the
identified stages and divided them into sub-claims.
Each claim is associated with a strategy that has been used
to develop the arguments supporting the top-level claims. In
other words, the strategy helps to clarify the approach used
for creating the claim.
A security assurance case breaks claims into subclaims, each
of which is broken into yet another level of subclaims until
the step to the actual evidence that supports that subclaim is
reasonably small [7]. For example as the claim C1.2.1 “Risks
of staff members losing login credentials are handled” is
broken down to two sub-claims, which are C1.2.1.1 “Password
management procedure in place” and C1.2.1.2 “Staff member
has individual accounts”, which then are associated with one
or more evidence to justify the claim C1.2.1.
Claims with a diamond beneath indicates that further de-
velopment is required to fully elaborate the claim-argument-
evidence substructure [7]. In the SAC there is no evidence
related to the claims C1.2.1.2, C1.3.1 and C1.3.2, however
this does not necessarily suggest that the company fails to
satisfy this claim or has not implemented it in the system.
Due to the limited time frame of our research we decided to
allocate more time to breaking down only some of the claims
into further detail, the chosen claims were based on the data
from the interviews and on the level of information and value
that was identified for each security feature from Table III.
At the end of the second iteration, we evaluated the first
draft of the SAC by interviewing three people from the
company. One of the interviewees works as QA/RA manager at
the company and the two others as developers. The questions
that were asked during the interviews lead to in-depth answers
that provided us with the person’s opinions on the topics based
on their expertise in their particular field of knowledge. The
data from the interviews were analyzed and the result can be
found with their corresponding themes in Appendix I.
P1 mostly discussed and gave feedback regarding the value,
challenges and quality of the case. P1 being the QA/RA
manager, could not help us with the technical correctness
of the case. P2 and P3 both being developers and aware of
the technical details regarding the system, gave us feedback
regarding the correctness of the case and helped us update the
SAC to make sure it was aligned with the company’s system.
Based on the data we gathered and analyzed from the
interviews, we updated and finalized the artefact. Table IV
contains all the changes that were made to the artefact (SAC)
after evaluation while the first draft of the SAC can be found
in Appendix J.
C. Derivation of the guidelines
At the end of iteration two, we developed guidelines that
can be used to create security assurance cases. The guidelines
are specific to cloud-based medical software organizations and
based on the steps we followed to construct a SAC for 1928
Diagnostics and our learning experience throughout the two
iterations. The guidelines are presented below as following:
Elicitation of requirements:
• The first artefact we created can be used by cloud-based
medical software organizations to make sure the external
security needs and requirements are fulfilled. Mapping the
external needs in the artefact to the company’s internal
needs can simplify the creation of SAC, when selecting
claims, arguments and evidence.
• It is beneficial to divide the whole system into subsystems
such as functions or components that can be used as a
top level claim, especially in large and complex systems
such as medical software. The selection of the top-level
claim should be based on the company needs and values.
For example, the selection of the top claim C1 in our
SAC was based on the high value the company puts on
ensuring their customers’ privacy.
• Arguments and claims can be extracted from a cloud-
based medical software company’s documents such as
software architecture and software design specification
documents, asset analysis documents, while evidence can
be found in threat analysis documents, risk analysis, code
reviews and test results etc.
Elicitation of requirements and Evaluation:
• To create a SAC in the medical software domain it is
important to have an understanding of the system, any
documents regarding security of the system are useful
to study. Gathering information from individuals such as
developers that are knowledgeable about the system is
also useful. Use any valuable resources available. In our
case gathering data from people in the company helped
us to create a more accurate SAC that was more aligned
with their system because there had been changes to the
system which was not updated in the documents.
Modeling:
• Using strategies in SAC is optional, but we highly rec-
ommend it because it allows the reader to understand
the approach that an argument is going to take [7]. The
phrasing of strategies is crucial, it decides how subclaims
will be elaborated.
• Using identifiers for the claims, arguments and evidence
in the SAC improves communication between stakehold-
ers and understandability for anyone reading the SAC,
because it allows referencing to certain elements easier.
Especially for software companies in the medical domain
since the stakeholders background varies to a large extent.
For example at the company we conducted our study,
bioinformaticians and developers work together.
Evolution and Modeling:
• The absence of evidence should be clarified to the reader,
as it might indicate further development is required or se-
curity measurement missing. For example in our case, we
added a diamond notation under claims without evidence
to indicate that these claims require further development
based on feedback from the company. This can be useful
to identify missing security features which can be crucial
for medical software companies.
The guidelines has been classified into four different cate-
gories: Elicitation of requirements, Evaluation, Evolution and
Modeling. The classifications describes in which part of the
SAC creation and for what reason the guidelines are used.
V. DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss the most important and interesting
finds, by presenting every artefact that was created in the
iterations and discussing how they relate to the research
questions. The last part of the section makes suggestions for
further work and acknowledges the study’s limitations.
A. RQ1
The answers to the question What are the needs and
the requirements for creating SAC in a cloud-based medical
software service organization? were found and developed as
an artefact in the first iteration.
The first draft of the artefact consisted only of two columns
which were the need and description. To increase the under-
stability of the artefact and make it clear that these needs are
general to any company in the same domain, we added two
more columns which were SAC and reference. The reference
column shows in which standard the need can be found.
The addition of the SAC column was inspired by the work
of Mohamad et al. [28], it describes how each listed need
relates to SAC whether using SAC to show usage of need was
beneficial or mentioned implicitly in the standards.
Additionally to avoid redundancy, we removed the listed
need Cryptographic controls based on a suggestion from
P2. These improvements were necessary to increase the un-
derstandability of the artefact and to support the creation of
SAC.
The artefact which is presented as Table I in Section
4 highlights needs that are specific to cloud-based medical
software service organizations, which should be followed by
the companies to ensure a secure system. The needs that are
recommended by the standards ISO 27002 [18] and ISO 27018
[19] such as logging, monitoring and encryption are general
to any cloud-based software. While the ones found in HIPAA
[20] are more specific to any organization handling healthcare
data.
B. RQ2
To answer the research question What does a prototypical
SAC in a cloud-based medical software service organization
look like? were partly found in the first iteration but mainly
being developed and improved in the second iteration. The
security assurance case was developed during iteration two
based on data gathered from iteration one and two.
The selected case (transfer of sample data to the cloud
service is acceptably secure) for the SAC prototype was
based on P1’s definition of a secure product. The SAC artefact
as seen in Figure 4 in Section 4 was built based on Table III.
Due to time constraints only some claims were broken down
into more detailed levels, these claims that were selected were
evaluated based on their relation to CIA as seen in Table III.
During evaluation of the SAC some of the practitioners
suggested to provide more detailed information in the evidence
part, while others recommended to keep the abstraction level.
We decided to keep the level of the abstraction since it would
be understandable by all stakeholders, not just the technical
stakeholders, which can improve comprehension amongst the
key project stakeholders [27]. Another suggestion was to add
a diamond notation under claims missing evidence, to clarify
that this claim requires further development. We applied this
suggestion to the prototypical SAC, since it improves the
understandability of the SAC and is also a part of the GSN
notions [5]. The technical practitioners also helped us with the
correctness of the SAC, based on their feedback we updated
many parts of the artefact to make sure it was aligned with
the company’s system.
During our study company representatives confirmed that
having security assurance shown in a graphical structure like
SAC would be beneficial to improve communication regarding
security between stakeholders, but also useful for new devel-
opers to find their way around the system [27].
Table III which is seen in Section 4 was developed to cover
the internal needs of the company, it gives an overview of the
security features the company has implemented. The identified
security features were mapped to the needs described in Table I
from the first iteration, combining the external and internal
needs was done to support the creation of the SAC prototype.
C. RQ3
The answer to the final research question Which guidelines
for creating security assurance cases should cloud-based
medical software service organizations follow? is based on the
results from the first and second iteration. The guidelines are
derived from the steps we took to create a security assurance
case for a cloud-based medical software service organization.
During our research, we found that before creating the SAC,
it is important to take into consideration who the stakeholders
for the SAC are and how the creation and maintenance of SAC
will fit into the process. The level of detail that goes into a
SAC depends on the stakeholder. From practitioners’ feedback
we learned that technical stakeholders such as developers were
interested in more detail while stakeholders with managerial
roles were more interested in an abstract level of SAC.
Another important lesson we learned throughout the re-
search and as a practitioner from 1928 Diagnostics also
pointed out, is that the creation and management of SAC’s
should be integrated in the software development process.
Creating and evolving security assurance cases in the software
development life cycle (SDLC) can help in finding security
requirements and features that need to be developed and focus
on what evidence needs to be improved at each stage of the
SDLC [7]. Additionally, it would be easier to construct SAC at
the beginning of the software development rather than waiting
until the system becomes larger and more complex making it
harder to gather evidence. For example, we could only create
SAC for a part of 1928 Diagnostics system with the given time,
because they already have a rather large system. In order to
include more details in the SAC and cover a larger part of
the system we would have to find more claims and evidences
which would require more time.
The guidelines which are found in Section 4 C are specific
to cloud-based medical software service organizations, which
want to create security assurance cases.
D. Future Work
As stated earlier, the proposed guidelines can be used
as a starting point for cloud-based medical software service
organizations for creating SAC. Due to time constraints the
guidelines were not evaluated, therefore we suggest to validate
the guidelines by applying them when creating SAC for cloud-
based systems in the medical domain. The results of our study
reflects on adoption of SAC in smaller companies, since our
study was conducted within a small organization. Future work
could be used to expand the scope and include bigger samples
in the research, as the interviewees mentioned the usage of
SAC might be more useful in larger companies that consist of
multiple subteams.
E. Limitations
1) External Validity: The end goal of our study was by
studying a small sample size, we would create generalised
guidelines that could be used by companies in the cloud-based
medical software service domain. Using a judgment sampling
method is low cost, convenient, not time consuming and ideal
for exploratory research design [23]. However the issue that
arises, is that it does not lead to generalized results, since
we only take one company’s needs into consideration when
creating guidelines [23].
Gregory [25] notes that “The outcome of design science
research (i.e., the problem solution) is mostly an individual or
local solution and the results cannot be readily generalized to
other settings”.
Being aware of this limitation and taking into consideration
that we are not covering the entire population in the domain,
we focused on creating guidelines that can be used as a starting
point to create SAC for cloud-based medical software service
organizations. However users of these guidelines should study
the situation and values of the population on which the study
was conducted with caution in order to understand to what
extent they can generalize the findings [26].
2) Internal Validity: Conducting successful semi-structured
interviews is a major challenge, interviews are a resource-
demanding data collection method; activities such as planning,
conducting and analyzing are time-consuming by nature [24].
There is a risk to induce errors in data collection. For example,
if the questions are open-ended but misinterpreted by the
interviewees the results will be influenced. The order of the
questions asked during the interviews can also have an impact
on the result, because it might lead to biased answers.
To mitigate these risks, the questions were prioritized based
on the objective of the interview and were timed-boxed to
allow full answers for every question. Additionally, we tried
to avoid yes or no questions to gain more in-depth information
from the practitioners. The interviewees were provided with
the questions and interview material in advance, so they could
prepare for the interview.
Being two interviewers during the interviews enabled us to
listen carefully to what was being said and helped us to ask
follow up questions and having deeper discussions with the
interviewees which led to us collecting more data [24]. Besides
the structure of the interviews, another drawback was the small
size of the company, which resulted in the availability of only
four different interviewees throughout the two iterations.
However since we conducted a qualitative research this issue
was mitigated, because we followed a purposeful sampling
technique and not random sampling [15]. The participants we
collected our data from are experts within their domains. The
interviewees were selected during different parts of the study
based on their expertise to make sure we could gather the
needed data at the right time of the research process.
3) Construct Validity: Validity of our result depends on the
reliability of any measurement instruments used during the
research [29]. This being a bachelor thesis and the inexpe-
rience of us as researchers might have led to the composi-
tion of interview questions that were misinterpreted by the
participants. To avoid this issue, we provided the participants
with the questions beforehand through email and started off
each interview with a brief introduction about the goal of the
interview. Beside that, the prepared interview questions were
checked with academic supervisors before the interviews to
ensure their understandability.
Using an online transcription tool online to convert the
recorded audio from the interviews to text, also affects the
reliability of our research, because it does not assure accuracy.
To mitigate this threat we used the tool as support to manually
correct the transcriptions.
VI. CONCLUSION
This research was an attempt to address the lack of guide-
lines and examples of SAC available to follow for creating
security assurance cases within the cloud-based medical soft-
ware service domain. By conducting a design science study
at a company in the domain, we created a SAC for a part
of their system by identifying the company’s internal needs
and external needs such as standards, regulations, and best
practices of cybersecurity in the domain. After evaluating
the SAC with practitioners from the company, we created
guidelines derived from the SAC. We believe the guidelines
coupled with the created SAC will be beneficial for companies
in the same domain that are looking to simplify the process
of creating security assurance cases for their system.
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APPENDIX A  





1.1. What is your role? 
1.2. How long have you been working at your current role? 
1.3. What’s the definition of a secure product for you? 
1.4. By looking at the presented artefact, do you think there is anything missing that is in use by 
your company? 
1.5. Do you think there is a need to add more practices and techniques to ensure security?  
1.6. Are any of these redundant? 
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APPENDIX C  
EVALUATION DATA FROM ITERATION 1 DIVIDED INTO THEMES  
 
 







Q1.1: What is your 
role? 
P1 - “CTO” 
P2 - “Software Developer” 
Q1.2: How long have 
you been working at 
your current role? 
P1 - “3 years” 
P2 - “3 years” 
Values Understanding what 
the participant 
regards as valuable 
when it comes to 
security. 
Q1.3: What’s the 
definition of a secure 
product for you? 
P1 - “Privacy of data, 
users shouldn’t be able 
to access and see data 
they are not allowed to.” 
P2 - “A secure product 
in this context would be 
something that is secure 
from the entry points by 
the user, basically 
through the browser, 
API and HTTP.” 
Q1.5: Do you think 
there is a need to 
add more practices 
and techniques to 
ensure security?  
P1 - “I don't think we are 
missing any big areas, 
but penetration testing 
could be useful.” 
P2 - “I would need more 
time to answer that, but 
to give a blank answer 
you could always 
tighten up your security 
but it would be at the 
cost of convenience of 
certain things. Without 
decreasing 
convenience, I don't 
think we should add 
anything at this point. I 
think it’s quite good for a 
service that is run over 
the web.” 
Q1.6: Are any of 
these redundant? 
P1 - “Monitoring and 
logging overlaps in 
some cases, but I think 
it’s good to keep them 
separated.” 
P2 - “I don't think having 
encryption and 
Cryptographic controls 
as seperate makes 
sense.” 
Structure In what way and how 
the company is 
taking measurements 
to assure security 
and comply with 
practices before 
creation of SAC. 
Q1.4: By looking at 
the presented 
artefact, do you think 
there is anything 
missing that is in use 
by your company? 
P1 - “I think if you have 
covered what’s in the 
whitepaper, you have 
the main things.” 
P2 - “I would need more 
time to look at it but 
from what I see, it looks 
like all the things we are 
doing and they provide 
reasonable security.” 
Usefulness In what way will SAC 
be useful to the 
company, who will 
benefit from it and 
how can it be used. 
Q1.7: Would artefact 
1 be helpful to create 
SAC? 
P1 - “I guess so, but I’m 
also interested in 
understanding how SAC 
could be defined from 
this.” 
P2 - “From what I have 
seen, yes. From the 
definition of SAC you 
given me, we can create 
SAC for all of the things 
mentioned in the 
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2.1. As of today, is there any security assurance done in your company? To make sure that a 
certain product or function is secure. 
2.2. If yes, what kind of security assurance do you have in place today? 
2.3. If yes on 1, who do you present this security assurance to? Who is interested to know that 
your product is secure? 
2.4. How do you make sure the product as a whole is secure? Is there anyone who does that? 
(not just different parts like logging, encryption) 
2.5. Were you familiar with security assurance cases before looking at the provided example? 
2.6. If yes, have you created a security assurance case? 
2.7. Do you think encryption and logging requirements would be useful as claims for ensuring 
security of patients’ data?  
2.8. Are you compliant with these practices? 
2.9. If yes, how do you prove that these practices are in compliance? (do you have a way to 
show that?). 
2.10. For the selected practices, can you provide us with evidence to justify the claims and the 
sub claims?  for example, test reports, tool output etc.  
2.11. In which part of the development process these practices are addressed? 
2.12. How can your company make use of SAC? 
2.13. Who would use it (roles)? In what way would it help them? 
2.14. What would be the benefit of using an abstract SAC? (A less technical detailed SAC, 
presented in an easier way for someone non-technical to understand, in another words, a 
low level of details )  
2.15. Do you think it’s more useful to have 1 SAC for the system as a whole or separate SAC’S 
for different parts of the system?  
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DETAILED EXAMPLE OF SAC [28] 
 
APPENDIX F 
DATA COLLECTION INTERVIEW FROM ITERATION 2 DIVIDED INTO THEMES  
 








Q2.5: Were you 
familiar with security 
assurance cases 
before looking at the 
provided example? 
P1 - “No I haven't seen it before, but it’s 
reasonable that you provide claims and then 
evidence of the claims. ” 
P2 - “Not in this particular format, no.” 
Q2:6 If yes, have you 
created a security 
assurance case? 
P1 - “-” 






it comes to 
security. 
Q2.3: If yes on 2.1, 
who do you present 
this security 
assurance to? Who 
is interested to know 
that your product is 
secure? 
P1 - “I would say mainly any auditor that looks 
at specific certifications, maybe customers as 
well.” 
P2 - “” 
Q2.7: Do you think 
encryption and 
logging requirements 
would be useful as 
claims for ensuring 
security of patients’ 
data?  
P1 - “I think the claim should be, if you don't 
have the right credentials, you shouldn’t be 
able to see any information and encryption is 
the method that we are trying to enforce that 
claim” 
P2 - “When it comes to logging, be extra 
careful. Encryption is fine, but when we are 
logging we make sure we have filters built into 
the program and drop certain things, we don’t 
log everything. If anything is personally 
identifiable we don't log those, it can be in the 
database. Not everyone has the permission to 
view the logs in our cloud service, it’s only 
people who have access that can see it.” 
Structure In what way 










Q2.1: As of today, is 
there any security 
assurance done in 
your company? To 
make sure that a 
certain product or 
function is secure. 
P1 - “Not documented in the same fashion as 
in a SAC, but yes we have some.” 
P2 - “I know we have done enough tests of 
the process of getting different certifications. 
The question is a bit vague and open, so my 
answer will be a bit vague. Ofcourse, yes we 
do regularly check that we are secure, but this 
is done inhouse, we do it as developers. 
However we don’t schedule it, except if a 
certificate requires it. Otherwise all of these 
security decisions are baked in during 
development.” 
Q2.2: If yes on 2.1, 
what kind of security 
assurance do you 
have in place today? 
P1 - “For example one of them is Audit trail for 
HIPAA compliance, to make sure users are 
only looking at data they are allowed to look 
at. We get trails of what data users are looking 
at and store them up until 200 days.” 
 
“Another example is that we have encryption 
for all traffic both in transit (sending data) and 
at REST (storing data), all the files are 
encrypted. When any operations are 
performed on the infrastructure, we use 
encrypted channels”. 
P2 - “” 
Q2.4: How do you 
make sure the 
product as a whole is 
secure? Is there 
anyone who does 
that? 
P1 - “There is no single person in charge of 
that, but we have one guy in the developer 
team who does most of the infrastructure stuff. 
It’s a common effort when we are setting it up, 
making sure we follow the best practices and 
have a reasonable amount of security.” 
P2 - “We don’t have a separate person 
assigned for this, so it’s kind of baked into the 
development process. We start out with a 
base of what we think is secure, like all the 
TLS stuff, encryption stuff, making sure the 
passwords are not easily guessable, using the 
right libraries and all that kind of stuff. For 
example if there are new places for user input, 
we make sure to sanitize it. A lot of the stuff is 
really hand in hand with the development. If 
we see something isn't secure, we fix it. It’s 
not scheduled per say, but it’s always there.” 
Q2.8:Are you 
compliant with these 
practices? 
P1 - “Yes I think so.” 
P2 - “In general yes, but if you would like me 
to be really really sure, i’d need more time to 
look through it.” 
Q2.9:If yes on 2.8, 
how do you prove 
that these practices 
are in compliance? 
(do you have a way 
to show that?) 
P1 - “No, not really.” 
P2 - “So, I would give you an example, when 
we had to certify for CE, HIPAA, one person 
usually drives it. Then we go through each of 
the points (requirements in standards) and we 
ensure that we are running it, kind of like a 
drill and check off stuff in the list” 
Q2.10: For the 
selected practices, 
can you provide us 
with evidence to 
justify the claims and 
the sub claims?  For 
example, test 
reports, tool output 
etc.  
P1 - “I think that's the main reason we are 
doing this thesis work, because we don't have 
that. By defining the claims and need for 
evidence, we can generate those evidence. 
It’s not something we have upfront.” 
P2 - “I think to answer that, you have to give 
me an exact format of what you are looking 
for, in terms of logging and monitoring I think 
we can satisfy that, there should be no 
problem. We could do a test run for you, like a 
random sample so you can see there is 
logging, there is monitoring.” 
Q2.11: In which part 




P1 - “In the development of the infrastructure.” 
P2 - “In the 3 weekly sprints of development 
process” 
Usefulness In what way 
will SAC be 
useful to the 
company, who 
will benefit 
from it and 
how can it be 
used. 
Q2.12: How can your 
company make use 
of SAC? 
P1 - “Definitely would be useful to understand 
what claims we have and guide us towards 
evidence as output.” 
P2 - “I think it will be very beneficial because it 
will be something that is gonna be like a 
manifest, something that you can test against, 
you can check against. Because right now like 
I said, a lot of these things are based on 
experience, and we might have written some 
stuff down somewhere. But this is gonna be 
more structured. So it’s gonna add structure 
and a checklist sort of a thing.” 
Q2.13: Who would 
use it (roles)? In 
what way would it 
help them? 
P1 - “In terms of development, it’s gonna be 
useful to know what the requirements for 
different certifications are in terms of security.” 
P2 - “The dev team, but the product dev team 
more than the dev team, it would be a good 
bullet list to check against.” 
Q2.14: What would 
be the benefit of 
using an abstract 
SAC? (A high level 
structure, less 
technical/detailed) 
P1 - “I’m not sure, but it would be less clear 
that the evidence you provide is actually 
fulfilling that abstract claim.” 
P2 - “I think the abstract cases would make 
more sense for business owners, product 
owners and probably customer base. But 
maybe it’s not gonna be as useful directly, 
because when you are doing security you 
wanna be as precise as possible in my 
opinion because that's how you get good 
security. Abstract cases are very good for 
convening what we do rather than how we do 
it, but when you want to give something to the 
product team to get that checkmark, you 
wanna be precise and even get into what 
possible algorithms to use for certain 
certificates.” 
Q2.15: Do you think 
it’s more useful to 
have 1 SAC for the 
system as a whole or 
separate SAC’S for 
different parts of the 
system?  
P1 - “I would say different, with different focus. 
The division into user privacy. For example 
one user is authenticated and is able to look 
at data in the system but they shouldn't be 
able to look at other people's data. I think this 
is a very different case from any other random 
person trying to break into a system and they 
shouldn't be able to see any information. The 
claim and evidence for these cases would be 
very different.” 
P2 - “Should be different for different 
scenarios, having just one makes it more 
generic. I guess it depends on what level of 












ARTEFACT 1 FIRST DRAFT 
 
 
External requirements for SAC to ensure the security for cloud services provider  
Practice Description 
Logging System user and administrator/operator 
activities, exceptions, faults and information 
security events should be logged and 
protected. Clocks should be synchronized. 
 Monitoring Security features are monitored 
automatically and through planned internal 
audits to detect and mitigate actual or track 
potential vulnerabilities and both actual and 
potential intrusions. 
Cryptographic controls There should be a policy on the use of 
encryption, plus cryptographic authentication 
and integrity controls such as digital signatures 
and message authentication codes, and 
cryptographic key management. 
Backup Appropriate backups should be taken and 
retained in accordance with a backup policy. 
Training Programmers should be training regularly in 
best coding practices that help to ensure 
security. e.g, define security requirements, 
Heed compiler warnings. 
Redundancies 
IT facilities should have sufficient redundancy 
to satisfy availability requirements. 
Encryption  All connections between users and web servers 
need to be encrypted using HTTPS/TLS, which 
means that no other person or entity can read 
or change the information exchanged. All 
stored user data, including sample files and 
database should be encrypted. 
Accessibility control  All the servers are Protected by stateful packet 
inspection firewalls, with only necessary 
services allowed. 
Offer tight control sharing, only specific users 
can access data. 
changes in user permissions that are initiated 
automatically by the information system and 
those initiated by an administrator. 
Firewalls  Uses strict stateful network firewalls to protect 
all servers, including those processing 
confidential user data. 
HIPAA compliance  Follow the rules established by HIPAA for the 
implementation of IT and software security 
controls. These requirements are important in 
order to protect personal health information.  
Records retention  
 
Customers should have  the ability to delete 
data and reports when no longer needed or 
when patient or donor consent is revoked. 
Customer data are stored until deleted by the 
customer, providing complete control over 
record retention and destruction.   
Project Administrators can lock projects to 
preventaccidental deletion of any files by 











APPENDIX H  
EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE SECOND ITERATION  
 
2.16. Is the structure of the security assurance case clear? (​the order and how its 
broken down: claims - arguments - evidence, with reference to context​) 
2.17. Are the notations understandable?  
2.18. Do you think the SAC is self-explanatory? 
2.19. What do you think about the case we selected (top-claim function)? Is it important 
to your company to have this part of the system shown in a structured way? 
2.20. Do you think there are details missing in the SAC? If yes, in which part? 
2.21.  Would this SAC be helpful to show that the company has security in place, to 
different stakeholders? 
2.22. Can you think of any other use cases for the SAC? 
2.23. Do you think the first level of the claims 1.2,1.3,1.4, are consistent with the first 
argument? 
2.24. Are the claims well constructed and aligned with company claims? 
2.25. Do you think the arguments are understandable?  
2.26. Do you think this SAC can be used as guidelines to create more SACs for other 
parts of your system? 
2.27. Do you think companies within the same domain can use this SAC as guidelines 
to create SAC for their products? 
2.28. Would the creation and maintenance of SACs be a part of the development 
process? If so, in which part? 
2.29. Who would be responsible to create and maintain SACs? 
2.30. Are all the presented evidences implemented in your system?  
2.31. Does the provided evidences justify the claims being made?  





















APPENDIX I  
EVALUATION DATA FROM ITERATION 2 DIVIDED INTO THEMES  
 
Theme Definition   Questions 
 
Answer 








Q2.19: What do 
you think about 
the case we 
selected 
(top-claim 
function)? Is it 
important to 
your company 
to have this part 
of the system 
shown in a 
structured way? 
P1 - “ Yes, it doesn't have to necessarily be called the 
patient's date because what we're running analysis on is 
bacteria. So in the perfect case, it's not patient data. 
actually bacteria data. I'm thinking just data or sample 
data. 
 
So  it's not really wrong that you say patient data. It's so it's 
not only DNA data. So it's sample data. I think. Yeah, it 
would be good. 
 
From my aspect, I like the idea of visualizing, visualizing 
this kind of information. From the claim and going down to 
the evidence a structured manner. ” 
P2 - “Yeah I think so, it’s one of the core parts. It is a 
reasonably good claim to work on, security wise. ” 
P3 - “Yeah definitely, this is one of the questions that come 
from customers when it comes to security.” 
Q2.20: Do you 
think there are 
details missing 
in the SAC? If 
yes, in which 
part? 
P1 - “” 
P2 - “I think the steps are fairly, at least for the second 
level of claims C1.1-C1.4, they are fairly broad enough. I 
guess you can always dig down and find individual steps, 
but those four definitely cover. Even when I quickly looked 
at it 2 hours ago, I think the main steps are covered.” 
 
P2 - Like P3 said, it depends on the level of detail. It is not 
mentioned for example file storage or blob storage, only 
database storage is mentioned. But there is more than 
that. So for example C1.3.1 if samples are not stored in 
web server. Where are they stored? But the claims are 
correct, they are not stored on the web server and the files 
are validated. 
P3 - “I mean of course since you have only looked at the 
system for a short while, there are some detailed stuff 
missing in the whole picture and if we start to add those, 
maybe it will come up and even change the first level. So I 
am not sure, but it doesn’t talk much about how we store 
the samples, it mentions we don't store them on the web 
server which is true but we store them at other places that 
are encrypted and all that might be pretty important and if 
you want to divide it up to claim, it maybe boils up all the 
way to first level. ” 
Q2.23: Do you 
think the first 
level of the 
P1 - “ Yeah, I understand but this something more 
technical, you can ask P2 and P3 to get the answer. ” 






consistent. I guess in between C1.3-C.1-4, is probably the 
point P3 mentioned that uploading samples to the website 
is secure, but we also wanna say the storage after 
uploading the samples are encrypted or secure. Right, 
because that is a different step from the database, 
consider it like a file server because we have huge files. If 
you wanna add it, it’s stored in a cloud server, because I 
think it’s fairly separated from the database and the web 
server. ” 
P3 - “-” 






P1 - “” 
P2 - “There was one, the one I thought wasn’t correct was 
E1.4.1.3-1, which is the connection to the database that is 
made through SSH keys. I mean yes we use a secure 
connection, but it’s a database that is not accessible, none 
of the ports are open actually. So what we use is a tunnel, 
it’s a cloud service provider tool that helps us to tunnel 
through the server without opening any open ports, which 
means literally nobody can ssh into it. So I guess yeah, we 
don’t really connect to database in that sense, our 
application connects to the database using a tunnel and 
that’s about it. We can do external backups, we never 
have to log in to the server. The claim is true, but the 
evidence is something else I guess you could say 
something like: ‘Secure encrypted tunnel or reversed 
tunnel’. I think most of the other things look okay. We could 
walk through all of them actually” 
 
P2- “So I also realized, the protection against DDOS, we 
had this implemented in the past but the product we were 
using we couldn't keep using. Right now we have it in the 
load balancer in the cloud service provider itself, but we 
were using a DDOS service provider in the past but we 
don't use it anymore because of hipaa compliances. It’s 
not that it's not implemented, we can use it when needed 
but now we don't have this like DDOS service provider. I 
guess DDOS is very specific, but could be something like 
traffic load instead.” 
 
P3 - “For example password manager is not enforced, we 
have told people this is a good thing to use. But we don’t 
check if people actually use it. It’s recommended.” 
 
P3 - “Small detail in C1.2.2, you mention download data. 
The user is actually not able to download samples, they 
are able to download results of the samples like graphs 
and pictures. 




your system?  
P1 - “” 
P2 - “So I guess, those were the main things that P3 
mentioned. But also the limited access to the production 
database, it is in fact correct but the limited means that 
only our application gets to write, nobody else has 
permission. The writing process is a very difficult path. 
That means there is no write access to people no 
whatsoever, only application. It’s easy to read out but 
extremely difficult to write. ” 
P3 - “Yeah so except the ones we mentioned, the SSH 
case, password manager and ddos protection.” 
Q2.32: By 
looking at the 
presented 
artefact, do you 
think it’s aligned 
with your 
system? 
P1 - “” 
P2 - “Yeah I agree” 
 
Final comments - “I guess to add to that, we are a small 
team and small company, so in some sense this 
knowledge is fairly compressed in a small team, which is 
the benefit of a small team. But I think this would be 
extremely useful in other places where there are 
sub-teams, each working in their own little bubbles. So 
having one of these to verify end-to-end that your system 
is secure, so I think in those cases it would be extremely 
useful to have this kind of SAC. I can see very good 
benefits, regardless of the level of details” 
P3 - “Yes, I am actually quite impressed. How did you dig 
up all this information?” 
 
Final comments - “For me it was the first time I looked at 
things like this, I must say I kind of liked it, it’s easy to 
follow and  gives quite good information.” 




and useful for 
them. 
Q2.16: Is the 




order and how 
its broken 






P1 - “Yeah, for sure. But, I'm just struggling a little bit with 
understanding and how this document should be used in 
relation to other documents and how it fits in the process. 
So that means we have to create these kinds of 
documents and we need to keep them updated. And I think 
it's very beneficial to have a graphical structure. 
Something, you know, like a visualization I think is a very 
good thing. But then for, for example, should, the links to 
the evidence be even more explicit. So for example, if we 
look at E1.2.2-1, so should that be even more specific to 
the actual evidence that it's actually handled in the web 
framework? should it be connected to the actual function?. 
I think the structure is there, but you can then argue if the 
references should be more detailed. I liked the structure 
very much,  it's very clear what is the evidence and the 
requirements with the claims and the arguing. I'm just a bit 
struggling with how we fit this today and that's not really up 
for me to answer. It's more along the lines of, of the 
development team and how they see this document. from 
a quality perspective. From my perspective, I think it's 
beneficial, but I think also that this information should be 
also available through the regular requirements 
documents. Something that we don't really have. This is a 
way, so let's say that we don't have full documentation of 
our product, but then we focused on security because it's 
so important. So then we decide to go with this method of 
documenting our approach to security. But then we have to 
make sure everybody on board uses this method for 
documenting our approach for example toward security.“ 
P2 - “Yes, it’s fairly clear at least with the framework. 
Makes sense with the things in the legend, when I look at 
it.” 
P3 - “I also agree it’s clear, even without  seeing anything 
like this before. It was easy enough to follow.” 




P1 - “ yeah yeah, for sure. ” 
P2 - “One thing I find interesting about this flowchart is that 
it only has possibility for a happy path, in the sense we 
made a claim, this is how we argue and this is how the 
claim was verified. Of course in this case it works, and why 
it’s SAC but what if it didn’t work, how would you represent 
that in this graph? Let’s say personnel aren't trained in 
secure key management. It’s what I don’t see in this 
graph.” 
 
P2 - “I don't know how SAC exactly works, but I was 
thinking if you could add a color layer, then you can 
represent those things. Red or green for evidence.” 
P3 - “Yeah, you could see the symbols and distinguish 
stuff, but I don't know exactly what you mean with the 
argument for example.” 
Q.2.18: Do you 
think the SAC is 
self-explanatory
? 
P1 - “ I can definitely, I understand it.with the legend is 
everything's really clear. You would need some contextual 
background information. So are there several security 
cases. Are they complete or not? you know, things like 
that, which is not visible in the figure. I don't think that's a 
problem, I mean, it's very self explanatory. One idea can 
be that you can have  a dashed circle under or something 
that indicates that,here's something missing. So then this 
could be also used as kind of a gap analysis to identify 
weaknesses. And gaps in the argumentation, so a dash 
line indicating that we need  more claims here.This is just 
an example.” 
P2 - “At least the way I see it, you are building up a case 
and with that it makes sense. But I guess it comes back to 
that idea, the case not covering the absence of certain 
things, is what I miss. But when I look at it it’s obvious that 
we have this point and we are trying to prove that this point 
is valid with all the evidence.” 
P3 - “I think it’s clear and you can follow, but something to 
make it even better. Would be a short description of what 
SAC is and maybe go through for these things in the 
legend. Max 1 paragraph for each describing what it is” 





P1 - “” 
P2 - “I think it’s fairly understandable, this is the thing does 
SAC require the argument to be extremely precise or not, I 
guess like the login system is secure, you could really build 
a lot on that. You could go down to for example what 
hashing algorithm you are using. I guess otherwise 
arguments are understandable, but yeah they don't define 
the level of detail I am supposed to go in.” 
 
P2 - “Like address uploading corrupted files, right? Like 
take, for example, there's so many ways to, to possibly 
think about corrupted files, like intentional corruption, 
network corruption, you know, like just accidental 
corruption. For example we accept text files that are 
zipped. It's a particular kind of text file called fasta and one 
could actually just wrap, like what you say, zip, some other 
files and upload it. I mean, we do some very basic 
validation, but the thing is the, the moment our, our queue 
picks up the work, it will fail because clearly when the job 
starts at stuff it fails, but we do not do like deep validation 
of a, you know, hundreds of types of file in the browser 
because you know, it's not reasonable to get the browser 
stuck doing that.” 
 
P2 - “But otherwise they are good, they are quite 
understandable for sure, but they don't tell me what level 
of detail I am supposed to act on”. 







P1 - “” 
P2 - “Yes, I mean I guess I would say yes, my hardest part 
of digesting SACs has been that for claims, we dont show 
the absence of bugs. It only shows what we have done.” 
 
P2 - “So yes sorry to answer your question, yes it does but 
I have a problem with this framework, that’s all. But I guess 
that’s how you design threat scenarios, you assume the 
level of the things you wanna deal with and beyond that 
isn’t covered, so makes sense.” 
P3 - “I agree with P2, I also could add so much more 
details maybe not showing here, of course it's hard to fit all 
the bits and pieces to this, yeah. On a high level of 
evidence it’s good I would say.” 





show a certain 
level of security 
in the company, 
and in this case, 




this SAC be 







P1 - “yes, I think that could be one way of using it. 
Depending on what the stakeholder is, I think it would be 
more of the technical stakeholder because if I wouldn't 
want to show this to customers,  I wouldn't want to show it 
to sales for example.  
 
Just the reason being that you don't want to show, I mean 
this is quite a lot of information about the system that you 
might not show them. 
 
I think if you want to present information towards sales or 
towards customers, it's more along the lines of like a white 
paper. 
  
But for the technical team and for quality and things like 
that, I think it's a very good document, but it needs to be 
put into its place in the process. because you don't want to 
have just another document, you want to have something 
that feels its purpose. ” 
 
P2 - “We talked a bit last time about this, but I think 
different stakeholders have different interests in how deep 
you want to go, define the level of detail. Overall I think this 
is great to probably present to non-technical leaderships 
and non-technical teams, it’s okay. But if you present to 
technical teams, then I for example would ask to put more 
detail in this, like every single step. It would take a long 
while though, because we would go through every single 
thing. But otherwise I think it is good.” 
P3 - “Yeah I kind of agree, it depends on the stakeholders, 
for a customer they probably don’t wanna look at this, but 
for some authority that is approving us, they would maybe 
want to see something like this.”  
 
P3- “If a customer really wanted to see this, they could and 
some customers are actually that interested in details, but 
most of them are not I guess, it’s not like sales material 
sales people would bring with them.” 
Q2.22: Can you 
think of any 
other use cases 
for the SAC? 
P1 - “” 
P2 - “Yeah so, it is a good framework for thinking, on that I 
definitely agree. But the level of detail depends on every 
person who cares.  
P3 - “I guess we are also stakeholders but for developer to 
developer communication it could also help, for a new 
comers to find their way around the system and also just to 
show ‘I am working on this high level security feature on 
the product, this is a way to prove that I am thinking about 
all the security issues.’” 
Generalization If the case can 
be used as 
Q2.26: Do you 
think this SAC 
can be used as 
P1 - “Yeah, yeah, for sure. Of course you could.” 
guidelines to 








SACs for other 
parts of your 
system? 
P2 - “Yes, of course.” 
P3 - “Yeah the quick answer is yes, it’s possible.” 
Q2.27: Do you 
think companies 
within the same 
domain can use 
this SAC as 
guidelines to 
create SAC for 
their products? 
P1 - “” 
P2 - “Yeah, and I guess that’s where the difference 
between being general enough and specific enough makes 
the difference ” 
P2 - “But it might change some on the lower levels of the 
SAC, because people maybe don't use the same stuff, like 
in the claims people maybe don't use web framework or 
database for example.” 
P3 - “Yeah I guess, it’s not for a particular product, I guess 
anyone could use this.” 
Challenges How the cases 
will be 
maintained and 










the creation and 
maintenance of 
SACs be a part 
of the 
development 
process? If so, 
in which part? 
P1 - “” 
P2 - “Like the level of detail that is here, doesn’t change 
that often. So I guess it’s one off thing that is gonna be like 
architecture stuff, design. Then it kind of is stale in some 
sense ” 
P3 - “I guess this is a tricky question, it’s of course really 
nice to have this. It gives a lot of information, but it also 
takes a lot of effort to both create and maintain, so I guess 
it’s important to value the effort against what it actually 
gives back. Documentation that is made to be used on a 
regular basis, is gonna find it’s way of being used in the 
process regardless who is responsible for it. I think just 
putting this to a person, it becomes a weird thing to 
maintain, but instead if you can flip it over and kind of 
make it something useful to drive team decisions, then it’s 






P1 - “” 
P2 - “Yeah I think like documentation that tries to cover 
these kinds of things, it’s easy to do it the first time, than 
after that unless it's a clear path for the usage of it on 
some kind of regular basis it usually doesn’t work out.” 
P3 - “So I guess it depends on who the main target of the 
SAC is, who the stakeholder is. As said earlier for 
communication between developers it’s good but then you 
need more detail and developers should maintain it. If it’s 
more for regulatory stuff, then someone like P1 (quality 
manager) but of course he can’t answer all of these 
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